theory testing and development. Grindle derives broad generalizations by detecting patterns across historical narratives. At the same time, she does not explicitly engage with much of the more theoretical work on the conditions that incentivize power holders to reform patronage bureaucracies (see, among many, Johnson and Libecap 1994; Ting et al. 2013). A fascinating read, Jobs for the Boys may thus also be interpreted as a call for not only redesigned civil service reform projects but also rigorous theory development that takes into account the now uncovered nuances in the nature of patronage and its reform.

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References


How do standards of risk regulation emerge and get internationally accepted by both public authorities and firms? The stimulating hypothesis put forward by David Demortain is that small groups of interconnected transnational scientists, working in regulatory agencies, research organizations, or companies, are primarily responsible for the establishment of new ways to manage adverse events. Prior to any regulatory decision, they manage to develop, diffuse, and impose new standards as accurate responses to risk controversies. These “invisible colleges” (IC thereafter) are built both through the professional and spatial circulation of a scientific elite interested in regulation and through interstitial organizations that bring together experts from various backgrounds. To demonstrate his thesis, the author follows and compares the trajectory of three regulatory concepts that have profoundly affected their respective domains (medicines, food hygiene, and novel foods).

The book is made of eight chapters that fall into three parts. The first part exposes Demortain’s framework of analysis. In the first chapter, the author explains the choice to focus on the definition of standards to study risk regulation using the concept of risk typifications (Scott 1998) or
stylized ways of thinking and talking about facts. The second chapter exposes the rationale for using the concept of IC (instead of more widely used ones as “epistemic community”) to give account to this standardization process. Demortain notably emphasizes that this expression was used in the late seventeenth century by pioneer scientist Robert Boyle to designate an informal collective of scholars grouped around him and Benjamin Worsley, that shared common conceptions of science and were frequently exchanging (and rarely meeting). The author then gives (chapter 3) his understanding of risk regulation as moving from a concern focused on the qualification of products (in his case, pharmaceuticals and food products) to the anticipation and imputation of adverse events emerging from the consumption of these products. From this thesis follows the choice of three case studies—Pharmacovigilance Planning (PVP), Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP), and Post-market Monitoring (PMM)—that are exposed in the second part of the book (chapters 4, 5, and 6). The third part of the book engages in a more general discussion on IC and the implications. Can we identify some characteristics in IC members’ profiles that make them different from “basic experts”? Demortain insists on their dominant position as concerns scientific publications and on “their accumulation of positions and projects” (171), such as advisory commission memberships. He concludes (chapter 8) with the dissimilarities between the three cases, contrasting the large consequences of the PVP standard on drug regulation with the more localized impact of HACCP and PMM, a difference explained by the structure of these regulatory domains.

The book makes two main contributions to the analysis of science-based regulation. The first is of course the invigoration of the notion of invisible college. The claim that IC is a more appropriate notion than epistemic community to study very influential groups of experts is very convincing both conceptually and empirically. It helps Demortain to underline the collective dynamics of what could have been understood as the result of “simple” entrepreneurship. The characteristics defining an epistemic community (Haas 1992) are demanding: Agreement is both very large—a community—and very deep—shared set of normative and causal beliefs, a common policy enterprise. Yet, these features elude true empirical demonstration, while the existence of an IC can be precisely investigated. In order to achieve this goal, Demortain uses not only traditional interviews and historical data, but also innovative quantitative tools that allow him to map ICs. While Demortain states that ICs are specific regulatory phenomenon, the investigation of the existence of IC (may be not as pure as in the case here exposed) in numerous domains would be quite valuable. The second main contribution relates to the nature and evolution of risk regulation. The comparison of three precise historical dynamics provides a stimulating viewpoint on today’s construction of market controls. Four common characteristics emerge from Demortain’s analysis: (1) These standards arise from personal and contingent initiatives. (2) They diffuse
owing to a blurring of institutional frontiers (notably the public/private divide) and multipositioning (which is susceptible to giving rise to conflict of interests). (3) It is difficult to link their success to any precise policy steering. (4) When implemented, no one knows the concrete impact of these standards on the protection of public health. The word “standard” is from the Old French estendart, which means military flag, and we can sometimes wonder if the standards described by Demortain are more than that: a banner that brings together IC, hoisted to signify their domination in a field, and helps to maintain it. These standards could also functionally work as backfires, to escape stronger regulation. To take the example of PVP, it can be understood as a legitimate response to the cerivastatin drug scandal that demonstrated lack of coordination between firms and regulators as concerned with the adverse effects of drugs. However, there are also grounds to assume that this drug should never have been on the market, an idea that engages significantly more radical regulatory change that cannot emerge from consensus. The meaning of ICs’ influence for public health and for democratic ideals is discussed in the last chapter, but the author could further develop the critical dimension of his study. Such critique would not need to be a denunciation, but to follow Michel Foucault “as both partner and adversary to the arts of governing, as an act of defiance, as a challenge, as a way of limiting these arts of governing and sizing them up, transforming them” (Foucault 2007). Despite this reservation, any scholar working on risks and expertise is encouraged to read Demortain’s book for the important insights it provides to the study and understanding of science-based regulation.

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References